Aircraft Leasing Funds for Accredited Investors: The Real Access Points in 2026
AE Industrial Partners Aerospace Leasing Fund II, LP filed an SEC Form D for a $300 million offering, and by the time the filing hit EDGAR the fund had already pulled in roughly $209 million of i

TL;DR
- Aircraft leasing funds buy planes, lease them to airlines, collect rent (a mid-single-digit cash yield), then sell or re-lease the aircraft at the end of the term for the residual value bet.
- Institutional vehicles like AE Industrial Partners Aerospace Leasing Fund II and FTAI/AB CarVal aviation SPVs are Reg D private placements: accredited-only, six-figure minimums, and largely closed to individual investors without an existing relationship or placement agent.
- YieldStreet's deal-by-deal aircraft notes (its United Airlines Aircraft Leasing Portfolio offerings, for example) are the main retail-adjacent door: roughly $15,000 minimum, about a 14% targeted net return, accredited investors only.
- Real risk sits in three places: residual value at lease-end, airline counterparty credit (bankruptcies happen), and maintenance reserve shortfalls.
- The One Big Beautiful Bill Act, signed July 4, 2025, restored 100% bonus depreciation permanently for aircraft placed in service after January 19, 2025. That's a real tax tailwind, but it mostly benefits partnership-taxed fund LPs, not investors in retail interval funds.
How aircraft leasing actually works as a business
Strip away the SPV structure and the fund-of-funds language, and aircraft leasing is a simple, capital-intensive business. A lessor, the fund in your case, buys an aircraft outright or with debt financing, typically a Boeing 737 MAX, an Airbus A320neo, or a widebody like a 787, at a price that can run $40 million to $130 million depending on model and vintage. The lessor then signs an operating lease with an airline, usually 6 to 12 years for a new-technology narrowbody, shorter for older or less liquid types. The airline pays monthly rent and stays contractually responsible for maintenance, though most leases also require the airline to fund maintenance reserve accounts that get returned or applied against major overhauls at lease-end.
The lessor collects that rent as current income. This is the yield piece of the return, and it typically runs in the mid-single digits annually on the aircraft's value. The bigger swing factor is what happens at the back end. When the lease matures, the lessor either re-leases the aircraft to the same or a new airline at prevailing market rates, or sells it outright. That sale or re-lease price is the residual value, and it is where most of the total return, and most of the risk, actually lives. Apollo's Merx Aviation platform, according to filings on SEC EDGAR's company search, targets mid-teen gross IRRs (roughly 12-14%) on used current-generation aircraft deals sized $15 million to $50 million, blending lease income with residual value appreciation or preservation.
Roughly 35% of the global commercial fleet operates under lease rather than airline ownership today, and that share has grown steadily because airlines like the balance-sheet flexibility. KPMG's Aviation Leaders Report pegs the leasing market's growth at roughly 8% CAGR over the next decade, with the industry delivering north of $100 billion in aircraft value in 2025 and forecasting $125 billion near-term. Strong demand, tightening supply from Boeing and Airbus production bottlenecks, and Fed rate cuts made 2025 a strong year for lessors. That backdrop matters because it is exactly the kind of environment that makes fund managers comfortable underwriting aggressive residual assumptions. It is also exactly the kind of environment where you, as the LP, need to ask whether those assumptions survive a downturn.
The real accessible vehicles, and who's actually locked out
Here's the part most content about "aircraft leasing investments" glosses over: the institutional leasing giants, AerCap, Air Lease Corporation, SMBC Aviation Capital, are not raising money from individual accredited investors. You access those businesses the same way anyone accesses a public company: buy the stock (AER, AL) on the NYSE. No accreditation required, no minimum beyond a single share, full daily liquidity. That is not what people mean when they ask about "aircraft leasing funds," but it is worth saying plainly before you go looking for a private door that doesn't exist at the retail level for the biggest players.
The actual private layer is thin and it is genuinely accredited-only. AE Industrial Partners' Aerospace Leasing Fund II is a Reg D pooled investment vehicle, the kind of fund that takes capital commitments from family offices, RIAs, and institutions, not $25,000 checks from individuals cold-calling the GP. FTAI Aviation and AB CarVal have both filed Form D notices for aviation leasing SPVs in the 2024-2026 window. These vehicles exist to acquire specific aircraft portfolios or engine pools, and access typically runs through a placement agent or an existing LP relationship, not a public offering page. You can verify any sponsor's filing status yourself on the SEC's Form D search tool in about two minutes. See the note below on how SEC Form D filings signal accredited-investor-only access before you take a broker's word for it.
The one platform that has built something close to a retail-adjacent product is YieldStreet. Its aircraft leasing notes, the United Airlines Aircraft Leasing Portfolio offerings being the clearest example, are deal-by-deal, not evergreen funds. You're buying a note tied to a specific pool of leased aircraft, with YieldStreet targeting roughly a 14% annualized net return: about 2.4% in current cash yield plus the bulk of the projected return coming from residual sale proceeds at the end of the hold. Minimum investment runs around $15,000, and you can view the structure directly on YieldStreet's offering page. It's accredited-investor only, and it's illiquid for the deal's stated term, typically a handful of years, with no public secondary market if you need the cash back early.
| Vehicle | Access type | Typical minimum | Target return | Who can actually get in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Air Lease Corp / AerCap (public equity) | NYSE-listed stock | Price of 1 share | Market-dependent: dividend plus share price | Anyone |
| YieldStreet aircraft leasing notes | Deal-by-deal Reg D note | ~$15,000 | ~14% targeted net IRR | Accredited investors |
| AE Industrial Partners Aerospace Leasing Fund II | Reg D private fund (Form D) | Six figures+, GP discretion | Mid-teens gross IRR (est.) | Accredited/institutional, usually via placement agent |
| FTAI / AB CarVal aviation SPVs | Reg D SPV (Form D) | Six figures+, GP discretion | Deal-specific, mid-teens gross target | Accredited/institutional, relationship-based |
| Apollo/Merx Aviation platform | Institutional fund vehicle | Institutional-scale | 12-14% gross IRR target | Institutional LPs primarily |
Notice the pattern: gross targeted IRRs across this space cluster in the 12-14% range, but that's a gross, fund-level number before management fees, carry, and fund expenses. Net-to-LP returns on most private aircraft leasing structures run more realistically in the 8-12% range once you back out a typical 1.5-2% management fee and 15-20% carried interest above a preferred return. If a pitch deck quotes you a headline number without clarifying gross versus net, ask directly. It's a fair, specific question, and any legitimate GP will answer it without hedging.
Where the risk actually lives
The yield piece of an aircraft lease is fairly predictable: airlines pay rent or they lose the aircraft. The risk concentrates in three places, and you should interrogate all three before you wire money into any structure.
Residual value risk is the big one. The fund's return assumes the aircraft is worth a certain amount at lease-end, whether through sale or re-lease. That assumption depends on aircraft type staying in demand. A widebody 777 or A380 variant can fall out of favor faster than a narrowbody 737 or A320 family aircraft, which airlines keep flying for 20-plus years because the supply chain and pilot training infrastructure around them is so entrenched. Buy the wrong airframe near the wrong point in its production cycle and the residual assumption in the pitch deck becomes a mark-to-market loss.
Airline counterparty risk is next. Airlines go bankrupt. It's a low-margin, capital-intensive, cyclical business, and lease payments are often among the first things renegotiated or rejected in a Chapter 11. A lessor with strong documentation gets the aircraft back and re-leases it. A lessor with weak documentation or a concentrated single-airline exposure eats months of downtime and legal costs. This is exactly why a single-airline-name deal, like a United-specific portfolio, concentrates risk in one credit, while diversified multi-lessee funds spread that exposure but often dilute the headline return. IBA (Ishka), the aviation valuation firm, tracks these lessor recovery patterns closely across airline restructurings.
Maintenance reserves are the quieter risk. Leases typically require airlines to fund reserve accounts for engine overhauls and heavy maintenance checks, but reserve levels sometimes fall short of actual overhaul costs, especially on older aircraft or when an airline stretches maintenance intervals under financial pressure. That shortfall lands on the lessor's balance sheet, and by extension, on your net return, at exactly the moment you're trying to remarket the plane.
Ask these questions before committing capital to any aircraft leasing fund or note:
- Is the quoted return gross (fund-level) or net (to you, after fees and carry)?
- What's the single-lessee concentration: is this one airline's credit risk or a diversified pool?
- What aircraft type and vintage, and what's the manager's stated residual value assumption at lease-end?
- Are maintenance reserves fully funded per the lease, and who bears a shortfall if the airline underfunds them?
- What's the actual holding period, and is there any secondary market if you need liquidity before then?
- Has the sponsor filed a Form D, and can you confirm accreditation requirements and minimum investment directly on SEC EDGAR?
The OBBBA bonus depreciation angle
Here's the tax mechanic that's actually new and actually matters in 2026. The One Big Beautiful Bill Act, signed July 4, 2025, made 100% bonus depreciation permanent under IRC Section 168(k) for qualifying property, including aircraft, acquired and placed in service on or after January 19, 2025. That reverses the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act phase-down, which had bonus depreciation sliding to 40% in 2025 for most property (60% for certain qualifying aircraft under the old transition rules). The National Business Aviation Association lays out the mechanics clearly in its July 2025 resource on the provision, and the IRS Publication 946 covers the underlying depreciation rules if you want the primary source.
For a leasing fund organized as a partnership, which is how the vast majority of these Reg D aviation SPVs and funds are structured, that depreciation flows through to you as an LP on your K-1. If the fund places a newly acquired aircraft into service and takes 100% bonus depreciation in year one, that can generate a substantial paper loss allocated to LPs even while the fund collects positive lease income. That's a real, legal way to defer tax liability on other income, depending on your passive activity loss situation and basis. This is a genuine current tailwind, not a recycled TCJA talking point, but it comes with real caveats: passive activity loss rules under IRC Section 469 can limit how much of that depreciation you can actually use against non-passive income, and it applies specifically to funds taxed as partnerships, not to retail-friendly interval funds or REIT-style structures that don't pass through depreciation the same way. Talk to your CPA about your specific passive income basket before assuming the depreciation shelters anything beyond income from that same fund.
FAQ
Do I need to be an accredited investor to invest in aircraft leasing funds?
For every private vehicle discussed here, YieldStreet's aircraft notes, AE Industrial Partners' fund, FTAI and AB CarVal SPVs, yes. These are Reg D offerings under SEC rules, meaning they're limited to accredited investors (roughly $200,000 individual income or $1 million net worth excluding your primary residence, or certain professional certifications). The one exception is buying public shares of Air Lease Corp or AerCap, which anyone can do through a regular brokerage account.
What's a realistic net return after fees, not the marketing number?
Gross targeted IRRs across this space cluster around 12-14%. After a typical 1.5-2% management fee and 15-20% carry above a preferred return, net-to-LP returns more realistically land in the 8-12% range in a normal market. YieldStreet's roughly 14% target on its aircraft notes is presented as a net figure to investors on that specific structure. Confirm whether any number you're quoted is gross or net before comparing across vehicles.
What happens if the airline leasing the aircraft goes bankrupt?
A well-documented lease gives the lessor the right to repossess the aircraft, though the process can take months and involves legal costs, especially in cross-border bankruptcies. The lessor then tries to re-lease or sell the aircraft, often at a discount to the prior lease rate if it happens during a weak market. This is the core reason single-airline concentration in a deal like a United-specific note carries more risk than a diversified multi-lessee fund.
Does the OBBBA bonus depreciation benefit apply to any aircraft fund I invest in?
Only if the fund is taxed as a partnership and actually acquires and places qualifying aircraft in service after January 19, 2025. It doesn't apply retroactively to aircraft already in service before that date under the old ownership, and it doesn't flow through the same way in retail interval fund or REIT structures. Ask the sponsor directly how depreciation is allocated on the K-1, and read the fund's Form D and offering memorandum before assuming a tax benefit applies to your specific allocation.
Author Disclosure: Jeff Barnes, MBA has no personal position in any company, fund, or platform named in this article. Angel Investors Network has no current commercial relationship with any party mentioned. AIN provides marketing and education services, not investment advice. Past performance does not guarantee future results. All investments involve risk, including loss of principal.
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About the Author
Jeff Barnes, MBA