Brighton Park Capital: The $4.5 Billion Growth Equity Firm You Haven't Heard Of (But Should)

TL;DR: Brighton Park Capital's SEC Form ADV (CRD 304261), filed March 31, 2026, confirms $4.48 billion in regulatory assets under management across two closed funds — a Greenwich-based growth equity firm targeting enterprise software and healthcare IT that most accredited investors have never encountered.

The firm sits in a gap most retail investors miss. That SEC filing tells a clean story: $4.48 billion in regulatory AUM, a registered investment adviser operating out of Greenwich, Connecticut, and a strategy that stays firmly in the middle market between early-stage venture and large-cap buyout. If you've spent time around private equity but somehow missed this name, that's not accidental. Brighton Park runs lean, doesn't court press, and lets its numbers speak.

Who Built This and Why It Matters

Mark F. Dzialga founded Brighton Park Capital in 2019. Before that, he spent nearly two decades at General Atlantic, one of the world's largest growth equity firms, where he helped lead investments across software and technology services. That background is not decorative. It explains the firm's exact positioning.

Growth equity as an asset class occupies the middle territory between Series B venture capital and traditional leveraged buyouts. Venture capital backs unproven companies with limited revenue, accepting high failure rates for the chance at outsized returns. Leveraged buyouts, or LBOs, acquire mature businesses and use debt to amplify equity returns. Growth equity targets a third category: companies that already generate real revenue, are typically profitable or near-profitable, and need capital to scale faster than organic cash flow allows. Brighton Park writes checks into companies with $50 million to $500 million in annual revenue. These are businesses past the existential risk of early-stage but still growing at rates that make them uninteresting to most buyout shops.

Dzialga brought Erica Keany Blob on as a senior partner. She came from a similar institutional background. The founding team's shared General Atlantic lineage gives the firm a coherent sourcing network and a consistent framework for evaluating high-growth B2B businesses. When I looked at the portfolio concentration, that heritage shows clearly.

The Numbers That Validate the Strategy

Brighton Park closed Fund I at approximately $835 million in November 2020. Fund II closed at $1.8 billion in November 2022, exceeding its original $1.5 billion target by 20%. That gap between target and close is a signal worth noting. LPs don't overcommit to a first-time manager's second fund unless Fund I is showing something real.

The combined capital base now stands at $4.48 billion per SEC filings. With approximately 32 active portfolio companies, the average deployment per company runs close to $140 million. That tracks against the stated check size range of $50 million to $250 million per investment. Brighton Park is not spray-and-pray. They make concentrated bets on businesses they understand deeply.

The sector concentration reflects a deliberate thesis, not an accident of deal flow:

• Enterprise software (SaaS and recurring-revenue models)
• Healthcare IT and health technology platforms
• Cybersecurity infrastructure
• Data and analytics services

These are all categories with predictable revenue characteristics. Enterprise software customers sign multi-year contracts. Healthcare IT platforms become embedded in clinical workflows. Cybersecurity is a non-discretionary spend category. Brighton Park's LPs are buying exposure to durable, sticky revenue — not moonshot bets.

Nine Exits in Five Years: The Paradox Case

A growth equity firm's thesis only gets validated at exit. Brighton Park has logged nine exits in roughly five years of active investing. That pace, for a firm deploying $50-250 million checks, is not common in the 2020-2026 period. Many peers got caught holding assets through the 2022-2023 rate shock with no path to liquidity.

The headline exit is Paradox. Brighton Park backed Paradox, an AI-powered recruiting and HR technology company, during its growth phase. Workday acquired Paradox for approximately $1 billion, a clean strategic exit to a large enterprise software platform. Workday needed Paradox's conversational AI recruiting capabilities to compete in the talent acquisition market. Brighton Park's thesis: back a business solving a real enterprise problem, help it scale revenue, and let strategic acquirers compete for it. The Workday deal executed exactly that playbook.

The active portfolio also includes names worth watching closely, all documented in Brighton Park's Crunchbase profile:

• Storyblok: A headless CMS (content management system) competing in a market where enterprise customers are migrating off legacy monolithic platforms. Headless CMS separates content management from content display, giving large organizations flexibility across web, mobile, and digital channels.
• Coralogix: A real-time log analytics and observability platform. Enterprises generate enormous volumes of operational data; Coralogix helps engineering teams find problems faster. The category is high-switching-cost once embedded in DevOps workflows.
• OPSWAT: Critical infrastructure security. OPSWAT protects operational technology environments, covering manufacturing plants, utilities, and logistics systems, from cyber threats. That is a different market from enterprise IT security and carries its own structural tailwinds.
• Silverfort: Identity security and zero-trust authentication. Identity is the modern perimeter in enterprise security. Silverfort's platform extends multi-factor authentication to systems that traditional identity tools cannot reach.

That is a coherent portfolio. Every one of those companies sells to enterprise buyers on multi-year contracts, solves a defined problem, and operates in a market where switching costs protect margins.

Why Growth Equity Sits Where It Does in a Portfolio

Accredited investors and family offices often hold a mix of public equities, bonds, and real estate. The case for a private growth equity allocation comes down to three structural differences from public markets.

First, growth equity firms can hold positions for 4-7 years and work actively with portfolio companies on go-to-market strategy, international expansion, and M&A. A public equity fund manager cannot call the CEO of a portfolio company and suggest a product pivot. Brighton Park can.

Second, the middle market remains less efficiently priced than large-cap markets. A company generating $80 million in recurring software revenue has fewer institutional buyers competing for it than a company generating $800 million. That pricing inefficiency can translate to better entry multiples and stronger exit returns for skilled operators.

Third, growth equity carries a different risk profile than buyout strategies. There is typically no acquisition debt at the portfolio company level. Brighton Park is not engineering returns through financial leverage. Returns come from revenue growth, margin improvement, and multiple expansion at exit. That profile can behave differently than leveraged buyout funds during credit cycle stress.

This could blow up because revenue growth does not always continue. Enterprise software multiples compressed significantly in 2022-2023 as interest rates rose and public SaaS comparable valuations fell 60-80%. Any fund that deployed heavily at peak 2021 valuations faces a gap between entry multiples and current exit multiples. Brighton Park closed Fund I in late 2020 and Fund II in late 2022, which means some vintage exposure sits in the complicated 2021-2022 deployment window. That's a real consideration, not a hypothetical. Private Equity International's coverage of Fund II noted the strong LP demand despite the challenging macro environment at close.

How LPs Access Brighton Park and What It Typically Costs

Brighton Park Capital is a closed-end private fund manager. You cannot buy shares through a brokerage account. Access works through several channels, each with different minimums and friction.

Direct LP commitment. Institutional investors (endowments, pension funds, large family offices) commit capital directly during a fundraising period. Minimum commitments for institutional growth equity funds at Brighton Park's scale typically start at $5 million. Fund II raised $1.8 billion; the average LP check was likely in the $25-50 million range given the institutional LP base. This channel is not accessible to most individual accredited investors.

Fund-of-funds and feeder vehicles. Some wealth management platforms construct feeder funds that aggregate smaller investor commitments and invest into the main fund as a single LP. This lowers effective minimums to $250,000-$500,000 in some cases, though it adds another layer of fees, typically 0.5-1.0% additional management fee on the feeder structure.

Secondary market purchases. Existing LPs sometimes sell their fund interests before the fund winds down, either through secondary brokers or dedicated platforms. Secondary purchases can offer a discount to net asset value during periods of LP liquidity stress. They also shorten the effective investment horizon since some capital has already been deployed.

Registered feeder structures. Registered feeder funds or interval funds holding allocations in institutional managers like Brighton Park are increasingly available through RIA platforms. These structures offer more liquidity than direct LP commitments but typically carry higher fee loads. Understanding growth equity fund access structures matters before you commit capital anywhere in this category.

Expect a standard 2-and-20 fee structure at the institutional fund level: 2% annual management fee on committed capital and 20% carried interest above a preferred return hurdle of 8%. That's the market-standard template. Some managers have moved to 1.75% management fee as funds have grown. Brighton Park's exact current terms are disclosed to LPs but not publicly filed in granular detail beyond what appears in the Form ADV.

The Comparison That Puts Brighton Park in Context

Where does Brighton Park sit relative to the names you probably know? The table below maps three growth equity firms by AUM, check size, and sector focus.

Firm	AUM	Typical Check Size	Primary Sectors
General Atlantic	~$84B	$100M–$500M+	Technology, financial services, consumer, healthcare
Brighton Park Capital	$4.48B	$50M–$250M	Enterprise software, healthcare IT, cybersecurity
Insight Partners	~$90B	$10M–$400M	Software, internet, data

Brighton Park occupies a narrower, more focused band. That focus is a feature, not a limitation. Generalist growth equity at scale can drift into areas where the team has less edge. A $4.48 billion firm that stays concentrated in enterprise software and healthcare IT can develop genuine pattern recognition across a smaller number of business models.

What Brighton Park Is Not

Brighton Park does not do early-stage venture. They are not seed investors, Series A investors, or even typical Series B investors. If you encounter a pitch for a pre-revenue startup claiming Brighton Park involvement, verify it carefully. The firm's stated strategy requires companies with meaningful revenue scale, $50 million at minimum, preferably higher.

Brighton Park also does not do hostile acquisitions or distressed debt. Every investment is negotiated with company founders or existing investors. They take minority or majority equity positions depending on the transaction, but the relationship is collaborative by design. That matters for founders evaluating growth equity partners and for LPs evaluating alignment between the GP and portfolio management.

They are not a hedge fund. Capital is locked up for the life of the fund, typically 10 years with optional extensions. If you need liquidity within three years, closed-end growth equity is the wrong structure regardless of how strong the manager is. Closed-end fund liquidity risk is a real constraint that costs investors money when ignored.

The Honest Assessment

Brighton Park Capital has built a credible institutional growth equity platform in a short time. The $4.48 billion in regulatory AUM is SEC-verified. Two oversubscribed fundraises, nine exits including a $1 billion Workday transaction, and a concentrated portfolio in defensible enterprise software and cybersecurity categories. Mark Dzialga's General Atlantic background is the right pedigree for this exact strategy.

What you don't know without LP-level access: actual fund returns, DPI (distributed to paid-in capital, the measure of actual cash returned to investors versus paper gains), and the specific entry multiples Brighton Park paid for its 2021-vintage investments. A firm can show a strong exit track record and still hold unrealized portfolio marks that face pressure if the exit market stays tight.

The structural case for growth equity as an asset class remains sound. The specific case for Brighton Park rests on a short but promising track record in a strategy the founding team knows well. For accredited investors with $250,000 or more available for illiquid alternatives and a 7-10 year time horizon, getting on the LP inquiry list for Fund III (whenever it launches) is a reasonable due diligence step. Our accredited investor private equity guide covers the documentation and due diligence process in detail.

Brighton Park won't call you. You have to find them. That's by design.

Author Disclosure: Jeff Barnes, MBA has no personal position in any company, fund, or platform named in this article. Angel Investors Network has no current commercial relationship with any party mentioned. AIN provides marketing and education services, not investment advice. Past performance does not guarantee future results. All investments involve risk, including loss of principal.